Is health outcome all that matters? To date, economic evaluation has tended to focus almost exclusively on the effects of health care on health outcome. This implicitly assumes that the only benefit to individual people of health care is improvements in health status. This assumption holds regardless of whether health status is defined narrowly -for example, in terms of combinations of disability and distress' -or more broadly to take account of the multiple attribute nature of health.2" We would argue that in many instances, however, people derive benefit from more than just improvements in their health status. Concentration on health outcome does not allow for the possibility of people deriving utility (welfare or satisfaction) from aspects of health care that do not directly affect their health status. Examples of such aspects are information, autonomy, dignity, and the process of treatment. We discuss these and other aspects more fully below.
The concentration on health outcome in economic evaluations is evidenced by the debate over recent years about how to measure health status."4 Although such work undoubtedly makes a valuable contribution to the development of economic evaluation, its focus is somewhat narrow. Of course, if health gain is all that matters to people this narrow focus is justified. However, if factors beyond health gain are important the definition of outcome may need to be extended to include these factors according to their comparative importance.
The issue is essentially establishing the aim of economic evaluation in health care. The answer most economists would give is that the aim is to ensure that scarce healthcare resources are used as efficiently as possible. But what is meant by efficiency? In economics there are various notions of efficiency, all of which incorporate some idea of maximising benefit in the face of resource constraints. The crucial question then becomes how do we define benefit? If benefit is defined purely in terms of health gain there is no problem with the current state of economic evaluation. However, if benefit is defined more broadly to include other sources of benefit besides health gain, there may be a problem. The extent of this problem will depend on the comparative importance of these other sources of benefit in relation to health gain, which will in turn depend on the service being considered.
If benefit is defined purely in terms of health gain there is no problem with the current state of economic evaluation. The value of reassurance has also been examined in the context of screening for cystic fibrosis."8 Ninety per cent of respondents stated that reassurance from a negative screen result was of "much importance" in their reason for being willing to pay for the test. In an attempt to value this reassurance, women who received a negative result were asked whether they thought the test had been a waste of time and, if not, what was the maximum amount they would be prepared to pay for a negative screen result. The mean willingness to pay values were found to be 16% higher after they had the result than before they had the test (this difference being significant). However, the authors expressed reservations about whether estimates of willingness to pay values after having a result provide valid information. Willingness to pay after having a result is based on the certainty of having obtained a particular result (in this case a negative screening result). The authors argue that this is less realistic than the uncertain situation which confronts patients before receiving their result. Willingness to pay after having a result is almost certain to reflect reassurance and gratitude. This may have combined with the certainty of obtaining a favourable result in pushing up willingness to pay after the test.
Although screening programmes provide the opportunity for reassurance, their existence may provoke anxiety in patients, thus creating disbenefits. This anxiety may arise as a result of publicity about the screening programme; individual patients being invited to attend the programme; or positive results. Qualitative studies suggest that anxiety may arise from such factors. 22 Despite the lack of work by economists in process utility, its potential importance is well illustrated by the considerable amount of work by other specialists over the past 20 years who have measured patients' satisfaction with the medical care they have received. Such studies have identified numerous factors that are important to patients in the process of treatment. These include humaneness; informativeness; overall quality; competence; bureaucracy; access; cost; facilities; outcome; continuity; and attention to psychosocial problems. 29 Clearly, clinical outcome is just one argument in the patient's utility function. Speedling and Rose state:
... it is the ability of the physician to communicate concern, warmth and interest in the patient as a whole person which evokes a positive response from the patient. The physician's expertise in curing the illness is rarely seen to count more than his or her facility to care for the patient's psychosocial needs.0
From this it follows that if the clinical outcome of two types of treatment were identical, the utility from these two types of care would not necessarily be the same.
The need to consider factors beyond some medical definition of success was supported by Pfeffer and This raised the question of why it is that patients want information but prefer to defer decision making to the doctor. Is it because of the disutility from choice itself or is it, as suggested by Shackley and Ryan,32 because of the potential disutility associated with the possible outcomes of the choice? If it is the latter, then anticipated regret about the decision may be important.
Anticipated regret about a decision refers to a position in which current decisions are made in an attempt to avoid regretting later having made the wrong decision. Regret theory was first postulated by Bell and Loomes and Sugden, who argued that when people made decisions about uncertain monetary outcomes they consider not only the final assets but also the probability of experiencing regret.36 37 It is postulated that when making decisions under uncertainty, people trade off financial returns to avoid experiencing regret.
Although regret theory has been applied mainly to people's decision making when monetary rewards are uncertain, it may also explain patients relinquishing the responsibility of making a decision to their doctor. The nature of regret is such that it can only be experienced after a choice has been made. If there is no choice, there can be no regret. By relinquishing the responsibility for decision making to the presumably better informed doctor, the possibility of the patient experiencing disutility as a result of regret is eliminated. Of course, it could be argued that in deciding to let the doctor choose, the patient is still making a choice, and therefore, strictly speaking, the potential for experiencing regret is not eliminated. However, we believe that in most cases the potential regret to the patient from letting the doctor decide is considerably less than the potential regret to the patient from the patient deciding himself or herself. Of course, patients may regret having gone through with the treatment if it fails and so feel worse off. This possible source of disutility also needs to be addressed.
NON-MEDICAL REASONS FOR VISITING THE DOCTOR
Economists have implicitly assumed that patients are motivated to visit the doctor out of a desire to have their health status improved. However, sociological work has for many years highlighted the importance of so called nonmedical reasons for visiting the doctor. These include legitimisation of illness, pleasing someone else, or even as part of the quest to qualify for a council house.4043 Thus, when patients visit a doctor, utility may be derived from sources other than improvements in health status.
Assessing the benefits ofhealth care
Benefits to citizens OPTION VALUE AND EXTERNALITIES Thus far, we have considered the consumer as a patient. When the consumer is considered to be a citizen, however, other sources ofpotential benefit can be identified -namely, option value and externalities. Option value refers to the utility obtained from having the option to use services. Utility may be derived not only for users of the service but also for current nonusers who may or may not use the service in the future. 44 The notion of a caring externality in health care was first developed by Culyer.45 Only recently, however, has the potential importance of including it in economic evaluations been recognised. 46 The caring externality refers to people deriving utility from the knowledge that other people are receiving health care.
To date, neither option value nor the caring externality has been included in economic evaluations in health care. We are not arguing that they should. What we are arguing is that the potential importance of including them should be investigated. Willingness to pay has been suggested as a means of measuring option value and the caring externality, but with the proviso that further development of the technique is needed. 25 The views of citizens and patients may differ from or even conflict with each other. One possible conflict has been suggested by Clark and Olsen in the context of a healthcare system that is funded by individual contributions. 47 The views of citizens and patients may differfrom or even conflict with each other. 
